Admitere Materat - UBB Cluj-Napoca - Managementul Securității în Societatea Contemporană

SUA şi Coreea de Sud – exerciţii militare comune

SUA şi Coreea de Sud au început execiţiile militare comune, numite “Key Resolve”, exerciţii pe care le desfăşoară anual.
Manevrele militare au fost puternic condamnate de Coreea de Nord. Aceasta a ameninţat Seulul şi Washingtonul “cu o lovitură nucleară şi a suspendat linia de comunicare pentru situaţii de urgenţă”.

Ca de obicei, Phenianul a condamnat aceste exerciţii, pe care le consideră a “o invazie a Nordului din partea unui Sud ajutat de Washington”.

Exerciţiile se defăşoară după o săptămână de tensiuni puternice în peninsulă.

Phenianul a ameninţat săptămâna trecută că nu va mai respecta, începând de luni, acordul de armistiţiu care a pus capăt Războiului Coreei în 1953 şi a ameninţat Statele Unite cu o “lovitură nucleară preventivă”.

 

Sursa: MEDIAFAX

Etichete: , ,


Redactia nu-şi asumă responsabilitatea asupra conţinutului comentariilor cititorilor. În situaţia în care acestea conţin un limbaj necivilizat ne rezervăm dreptul de a le opri de la publicare. De asemnea invităm comentatorii să se refere strict la subiectul aflat în dezbatere şi să nu aducă atingere demnităţii altor persoane. Vă invităm pe toţi la o dezbatere civilizată, argumentată bazată pe respect.

3 Responses to “SUA şi Coreea de Sud – exerciţii militare comune”

  1. ROBERT HORVATH SUA says:

    Stimata doamna Simona Gheorghe
    Intradevar armele lui Saddam au fost ascunse in Romania.
    Informatia este confidentiala. Subiectul este “deocamdata”
    inchis.

    Desvaluirile mele
    se bazeaza pe documente capturate de trupele americane odate cu invazia Irakului. 1- Ele reliefeaza doua faze importante. Transferul tehnologiei nucleare si a rachetelor de transport a bombei atomice amostenite de la Ceausecu catre Sadam, 2- Ascunderea urmelor prin ascunderea armelor de distrugere in masa la Ambasada Irakului la Bucuresti si la 27 depozite militare.
    Dupa terminarea razboiului 1000 de specialisti sau deplasat in Irak si nu au gasit
    nimic. La jumate de an au inceput sa apara documente in limba araba despre actiunile guvernantilor romani, servicilor speciate si a mafiei din industri militara.
    A inceput imediat conspiratia administratiei Bush de a scoate basma curata pe prietenii teroristilor din Romania. Motuvele sunt cunoscute.
    O parte din conspiratie este desvaluita de sefului inspectorilor ONU Scott Ritter.
    Iata ce spune inspectorul sef despre actiune CIA purtand numele cod Tea Cup:
    “I carried out under Tea Cup was aimed at disrupting efforts to obtain ballistic-missile technology and production capabilities from Aerofina, a Romanian military-industrial company. Intercepted conversations between the Iraqi team, headed by Dr. Hamid, and his Romanian intermediary ( BASESCU ) pointedly referred to the oil-for-food program as a means of facilitating the transfer of goods from Romania”
    Saptamana trcuta am facut o depozitie sub juramant in fata diferitelor comisii a Senatului si a Camerei reprezentantilor interesate in acest caz.
    ADMINISTRATIA OBAMA FACE TOATE EFORTURILE DE A FACE LUMINA IN ACEASTA URIASA CONSPIRATIE.

  2. ROBERT HORVATH SUA says:

    NU O SPUN EU CI SEFUL INSPECTORILOR ONU SCOTT RITER
    DESCHIDETI
    http://www.iraqwatch.org/suppliers/Commentary-debate.
    One of the last major operations I carried out under Tea Cup was aimed at disrupting efforts to obtain ballistic-missile technology and production capabilities from Aerofina, a Romanian military-industrial company. In the end, none of the activity turned out to be of a proscribed nature, but intercepted conversations between the Iraqi team, headed by Dr. Hamid, and his Romanian intermediary pointedly referred to the oil-for-food program as a means
    of facilitating the transfer of goods from Romania.

    Citing secret missile contracts with the Romanian company Aerofina, Mr. Ritter claims that none of Aerofina’s deals with Iraq “turned out to be of a proscribed nature.” Yet Aerofina agreed to supply missile-engine parts, gyroscopes for missile guidance, the tools and equipment needed to produce these items, and the equipment needed to test them. Iraq claimed that these purchases were made for short-range missiles, which it is permitted to develop on its own. The crucial fact, however, is that a total arms embargo under Resolution 687 is still in effect on the sale of any missile parts to Iraq—whether for short- or long- range missiles. Thus Mr. Ritter is wrong again: the Aerofina deals were indeed “proscribed.” They were proscribed when they occurred, and they are proscribed today.

  3. ROBERT HORVATH SUA says:

    REDACTIE
    AM PRIMIT AUTORIZATIE ACUM CATEVA MINUTE

    SCANDALUL SECOLULUI !
    ARMELE DE DISTRUGERE IN MASA AU PROVENIT DIN ROMANIA
    http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/neighbors-the-weapons-components-were-hidden-in-the-tigris-1.34507

    A fascinating example that highlights the difficulties of inspection was published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in May 1998, three months after the last big blowup between Iraq and the UNSCOM inspectors. According to the report, an Iraqi procurement delegation was sent to Bucharest with the purpose of acquiring special components for installation in long-range ballistic missiles. For the most part, the Iraqi shopping list consisted of gyroscopes, pressure regulators and potentiometers (components that control the direction of the gyroscopes). These components are responsible for the navigational accuracy of the missile, and its ability to hit the target with precision. They can be procured in a few ways: ordered from the manufacturer, bought second-hand, or by dismantling Russian ballistic missiles and removing their componentry. The Iraqis, it seems, were working on all three fronts.

    Evidently, the Iraqi delegation had no trouble finding their way to Bucharest. Already in November 1995, Jordanian customs authorities seized a shipment of 240 gyroscopes, primers and other sophisticated components, all of which appeared on the shipping manifest as being intended for a research department at Baghdad University.

    The componentry was traced to the Romanian company Europina, which manufactures components for ballistic missiles. The contact person for the purchase was Wiam Gharbiah, a Jordanian of Palestinian descent who was subsequently jailed in Iraq on suspicion of fraud. The source of information for this shipment was Israel. And how do we know that? Scott Ritter told the story.